Terrorism and new media: the cyber-battlespace by Conway, Maura
 1 
TERRORISM & NEW MEDIA: THE CYBER BATTLE SPACE 
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_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter has very little to contribute about so-called ‘cyberterrorism’ (i.e. acts of 
terrorism carried out using the Internet and/or against Internet infrastructures);1 
instead, it is centrally concerned with what Resnick describes as ‘Political uses of the 
Net’: the employment of the Internet by ordinary citizens, political activists, organised 
interests, governments and others to achieve political goals which has little or nothing 
to do with the Internet per se.2 Specifically, the focus here is on the use(s) made of the 
Internet by terrorist groups. What are terrorist groups attempting to do by gaining a 
foothold in cyberspace? A small number of researchers have addressed this question 
in the past five years.3 Probably the best known of these analyses is Gabriel 
Weimann’s report for the US Institute of Peace entitled www.terrorism.net: How 
Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet.4 Weimann identifies eight major ways in which, 
he says, terrorists currently use the Internet. These are psychological warfare, 
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publicity and propaganda, data mining, fund raising, recruitment and mobilization, 
networking, information sharing and planning and coordination.5 Having considered 
Weimann’s categorisation in conjunction with those suggested by Cohen, Furnell and 
Warren, and Thomas,6 the present analysis is concerned with what have been 
determined to be the current five core terrorist uses of the Net: information provision, 
recruitment, financing, networking and information gathering. Each of these is 
described and analysed in more detail below. The available responses to this increased 
terrorist reliance on the Internet are also considered in some detail in the second half 
of this chapter. Initially, however, a brief explanation as to why the Internet is viewed 
by terrorists as such an attractive tool is in order.  
 
Why the Internet? 
Thomas Friedman has argued that contemporary globalization “goes farther, faster, 
cheaper, and deeper.”7 He might have been describing the Internet.  
The Internet is a powerful tool, which is used and manipulated by actors to 
accomplish a wide variety of tasks. The networked nature of the Internet allows users 
to access a nearly limitless supply of information and data that can be shared across 
the network. People can use the Internet to educate themselves, to entertain 
themselves, to conduct business, to shop, or to engage in political action. There is no 
a priori reason, however, why actors should use the Internet to engage in these 
activities over any other potential tool that will garner the same result. As with any 
tool, the Internet does not exist in a vacuum; rather, actors are presented with different 
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options and make choices based on relative advantages. If actors are to use the 
Internet, it must offer relative advantages over other potential tools. If no such 
comparative benefit exists, actors will see no utility in using the Internet, opting 
instead for some other, more effective, option.  
There are nine key properties of the Internet that render it different from 
traditional media and a key instrumental power source:  
- Volume: far larger volumes of information can be transferred easily compared 
with previous modes of communication. 
- Speed: the ability to compress data and more space for transmitting data 
decrease the amount of time it takes to exchange information.   
- Format: the ability to combine text, graphics, audio, and video means that in-
depth, dynamic, and visually stimulating communication is possible 
simultaneously. 
- Direction: the possibilities for two-way interactive communication are greatly 
expanded on the WWW as a result of the greater space and speed, but also due 
to the enhanced horizontal or lateral links arising out of hypertext linkage 
between sites.  
- Individual Control:  the opening up of control over direction in the sending 
and receiving of information means that power is decentralized to the 
individual user who has the choice of not only what to view, but also what to 
publish.  
- Anonymity: Internet users enjoy a large measure of anonymity. There are 
numerous information security applications that allow customers to conceal 
their identity, the content of their communications, or the details of their 
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transactions. These include free e-mail services, electronic remailers, 
anonymizers, and widely available encryption and steganographic tools. 
- Evasion of Government Control: the primary way in which actors may evade 
government control is through operating their Web site(s) in jurisdictions with 
high levels of free speech protection. The various tools identified above may 
also be used to avoid censorship. 
-  Reduced Transaction Costs: registering a Web site costs less than US$50 and 
many Internet sites allow users to create Web sites at no cost at all. Free e-mail 
services are commonplace on the Internet while newsgroups and message 
postings are likewise available at no cost.  
- Globality: perhaps most importantly, these low-cost Internet technologies 
allow users to transmit and share information globally nearly instantaneously. 
The networked structure of the Internet finds the quickest and most effective 
route for information flows. Web sites from anywhere in the world take only 
seconds to load while e-mails can circle the globe in an instant.  
In summary, then, Web-based communication has the potential to be a more 
immediate, individual, dynamic, in-depth, interactive, anonymous, unedited, cheaper, 
and far-reaching process than is possible in conventional media. Terrorists are well 
aware of these properties of the Internet and this explains why they have taken to the 
medium with such alacrity.  
 
The Five Core Terrorist Uses of the Internet 
 
Information Provision 
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This refers to efforts by terrorists to engage in publicity, propaganda and, ultimately, 
psychological warfare. “In the modern era, the truism that ‘information is power’ is 
very clearly understood by the media and governments; it is also understood by 
terrorists, their audiences, and their adversaries.”8 The Internet, and the advent of the 
World Wide Web in particular, have significantly increased the opportunities for 
terrorists to secure publicity. This can take the form of historical information, profiles 
of leaders, manifestos, etc. But terrorists can also use the Internet as a tool of 
psychological warfare through spreading disinformation, delivering threats, and 
disseminating horrific images, such as the beheading of American entrepreneur Nick 
Berg in Iraq and US journalist Daniel Pearl in Pakistan via their Web sites.9 These 
functions are clearly improved by the Web’s enhanced volume, increased speed of 
data transmission, low-cost, relatively uncontrolled nature, and global reach.  
In the past, those characterised as ‘terrorists’ were rarely accepted by the mass 
media as legitimate or authoritative sources of news in their own right. Neither were 
they accepted as reliable commentators upon the political situation that had given rise 
to the violence: “Certainly, on the few occasions when the BBC or ITV interviewed 
Republican para-militaries in the 1970s and 1980s, they were emphatically not, as a 
matter of policy, treated as individuals whose opinions could be accorded the same 
respect and due consideration as others.”10 By concentrating almost exclusively on the 
violent dimension of terrorism, making no attempt to contextualise its causes, media 
reports often leave readers, viewers, or listeners mystified as to the motivation of 
violent acts.11 The upshot of this is that many in the media audience take these acts to 
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be simply the senseless, inexplicable behaviour of psychotic fundamentalists or 
extremist lunatics.12  
  The establishment of dedicated Websites, on the other hand, offers 
terrorist groups an unprecedented level of direct control over the content of their 
message(s). It considerably extends their ability to shape how different target 
audiences perceive them and to manipulate not only their own image, but also the 
image of their enemies. Although, for many groups, their target audience may be 
small, an Internet presence is nonetheless expected. Regardless of the number of 
hits a site receives, a well-designed and well-maintained Web site gives a group 
an aura of legitimacy while also seeking to advance the organization's political 
and ideological agenda. The latter is a core function in and of itself, but clearly 
the sites’ information provision role also evidences significant overlaps with the 
other terrorist uses of the Net outlined below, particularly recruitment.  
 
Recruitment 
This refers to groups’ efforts to recruit and mobilize sympathizers to more actively 
support terrorist causes or activities. The Web offers a number of ways for achieving 
this: it makes information gathering easier for potential recruits by offering more 
information, more quickly, and in multimedia format; the global reach of the Web 
allows groups to publicize events to more people; and by increasing the possibilities 
for interactive communication, new opportunities for assisting groups are offered, 
along with more chances for contacting the group directly. Finally, through the use of 
discussion forums, it is also possible for members of the public--whether supporters 
or detractors of a group--to engage in debate with one another. This may assist the 
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terrorist group in adjusting their position and tactics and, potentially, increasing their 
levels of support and general appeal.13   
Online recruitment by terrorist organizations is said to be widespread. Harris 
et al provide the example of an Iranian site that boasts an application for suicide 
bombers guaranteeing that the new ‘martyr’ will take seventy relatives with him into 
heaven. If the recruit is unsure about joining, or if the group is unsure about the 
recruit, he is directed to a chat room where he is ‘virtually’ vetted. If he passes muster, 
he will be directed to another chat room for further vetting, and finally contacted 
personally by a group member. This process is said to be aimed at weeding out 
‘undesirables’ and potential infiltrators.14 It is more typical, however, for terrorist 
groups to actively solicit for recruits rather than waiting for them to simply present 
themselves. Weimann suggests that terrorist recruiters may use interactive Internet 
technology to roam online chat rooms looking for receptive members of the public, 
particularly young people. Electronic bulletin boards could also serve as vehicles for 
reaching out to potential recruits.15 
 
Financing 
This refers to efforts by terrorist groups to raise funds for their activities. Money is 
terrorism’s lifeline; it is “the engine of the armed struggle.”16 The immediacy and 
interactive nature of Internet communication, combined with its high-reach properties, 
opens up a huge potential for increased financial donations as has been demonstrated 
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by a host of non-violent political organizations and civil society actors.  Terrorists 
seek financing both via their Web sites and by using the Internet infrastructure to 
engage in resource mobilization using illegal means.  
Numerous terrorist groups request funds directly from Web surfers who visit 
their sites. Such requests may take the form of general statements underlining the 
organizations need for money, more often than not however requests are more direct 
urging supporters to donate immediately and supplying either bank account details or 
an Internet payment option. For example, the IRA’s main Web site contains a page on 
which visitors can make credit card donations.17 While, at one time, the Ulster 
Loyalist Information Service, which was affiliated with the Loyalist Volunteer Force 
(LVF), and accepted funds via PayPal, invited those who were “uncomfortable with 
making monetary donations” to donate other items, including bullet-proof vests. 
Another way in which groups raise funds is through the establishment of online stores 
and the sale of items such as books, audio and video tapes, flags, t-shirts, etc.  
The Internet facilitates terrorist financing in a number of other ways besides 
direct solicitation via terrorist Web sites. According to Jean-Francois Ricard, one of 
France’s top anti-terrorism investigators, many Islamist terror plots are financed 
through credit card fraud.18 Imam Samudra, sentenced to death for his part in the Bali 
bombing of 2002, has published a prison memoir of some 280 pages, which includes a 
paper that acts as a primer on ‘carding.’19 According to Dutch experts, there is strong 
evidence from international law enforcement agencies such as the FBI that at least 
some terrorist groups are financing their activities via advanced fee fraud, such as 
Nigerian-style scam e-mails. To date, however, solid evidence for such claims has not 
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entered the public realm.20 There is ample evidence, however, to support the 
contention that terrorist-affiliated entities and individuals have established Internet-
related front businesses as a means of raising money to support their activities. For 
example, in December 2002, InfoCom, a Texas-based ISP, was indicted along with its 
individual corporate officers on thirty-three counts relating to its provision of 
communication services, in-kind support, and funds to terrorist organizations 
including Hamas and its affiliate the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and 
Development (HLFRD). InfoCom’s capital was donated primarily by Nadia Elashi 
Marzook, wife of Hamas figurehead Mousa Abu Marzook.21  
Terrorist organizations have a history of exploiting not just businesses, but 
also charities as undercover fundraising vehicles. This is particularly popular with 
Islamist terrorist groups, because of the injunction that observant Muslims make 
regular charitable donations. In some cases, terrorist organizations have actually 
established charities with allegedly humanitarian purposes. Examples of such 
undertakings include Mercy International, Wafa al-Igatha al-Islamiya, Rabita Trust, Al 
Rasheed Trust, Global Relief Fund, Benevolence International Foundation, and Help 
The Needy. Along with advertising in sympathetic communities’ press, these 
‘charities’ also advertised on websites and chat rooms with Islamic themes, pointing 
interested parties to their Internet homepages.  
 Terrorists have also infiltrated branches of existing charities to raise funds 
clandestinely. Many such organizations provide the humanitarian services advertised: 
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feeding, clothing, and educating the poor and illiterate, and providing medical care for 
the sick. However, some such organizations, in addition to pursuing their publicly 
stated mission of providing humanitarian aid, also pursue a covert agenda of 
providing material support to militant groups. These organizations’ Web-based 
publicity materials may or may not provide hints as to their secret purposes.  
 
Networking 
This refers to groups’ efforts to flatten their organizational structures and act in a 
more decentralized manner through the use of the Internet, which allows dispersed 
actors to communicate quickly and coordinate effectively at low cost. The Internet 
allows not only for intra-group communication, but also inter-group connections. The 
Web enhances terrorists’ capacities to transform their structures and build these links 
because of the alternative space it provides for communication and discussion and the 
hypertext nature of the Web, which allows for groups to link to their internal sub-
groups and external organizations around the globe from their central Web site.  
 
Transforming Organizational Structures 
Rand's John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini have been pointing to the 
emergence of new forms of terrorist organization attuned to the information age for 
some time. They contend, “terrorists will continue to move from hierarchical toward 
information-age network designs. More effort will go into building arrays of 
transnationally internetted groups than into building stand alone groups.”22 This type 
of organizational structure is qualitatively different from traditional hierarchical 
                                                 
22
 John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt & Michele Zanini, “Networks, Netwar and Information-Age 
Terrorism.’ In Countering the New Terrorism, edited by Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, 
David F. Ronfeldt, Michele Zanini, and Brian Michael Jenkins (California: Rand, 1999), p.41. Full text 
available online at http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR989/MR989.chap3.pdf. 
 11 
designs. Terrorists are ever more likely to be organized to act in a more fully 
networked, decentralized, ‘all-channel’ manner. Ideally, there is no single, central 
leadership, command, or headquarters. Within the network as a whole there is little or 
no hierarchy and there may be multiple leaders depending upon the size of the group. 
In other words, there is no specific heart or head that can be targeted. To realize its 
potential, such a network must utilize the latest information and communications 
technologies. The Internet is becoming an integral component of such organizations, 
according to the Rand analysts.23  
  
Planning and Coordination 
“Many terrorist groups share a common goal with mainstream organizations and 
institutions: the search for greater efficiency through the Internet.”24 Several reasons 
have been put forward to explain why modern IT systems, especially the Internet, are 
so useful for terrorists in establishing and maintaining networks. As already 
discussed, new technologies enable quicker, cheaper, and more secure information 
flows. In addition, the integration of computing with communications has 
substantially increased the variety and complexity of the information that can be 
shared.25  
This led Michele Zanini to hypothesize that “the greater the degree of 
organizational networking in a terrorist group, the higher the likelihood that IT is used 
to support the network’s decision making.”26 Zanini’s hypothesis appears to be borne 
out by recent events. For example, many of the terrorists indicted by the United States 
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government since 9/11 communicated via e-mail. The indictment of four members of 
the Armed  Islamic Group (Gama’a al-Islamiyya) alleges that computers were used 
“to transmit, pass and disseminate messages, communications and information 
between and among IG leaders and members in the United States and elsewhere 
around the world.”27 Similarly, six individuals indicted in Oregon in 2002 allegedly 
communicated via e-mail regarding their efforts to travel to Afghanistan to aid al-
Qaeda and the Taliban in their fight against the United States. 28 
 The Internet has the ability to connect not only members of the same terrorist 
organizations but also members of different groups. For example, hundreds of so-
called ‘jihadist’ sites exist that express support for terrorism. According to Weimann, 
these sites and related forums permit terrorists in places as far-flung as Chechnya, 
Palestine, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Turkey, Iraq, Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Lebanon to exchange not only ideas and suggestions, but also practical information 
about how to build bombs, establish terror cells, and ultimately perpetrate attacks.29 
 
Mitigation of Risk  
As terrorist groups come under increasing pressure from law enforcement, they have 
been forced to evolve and become more decentralized. This is a structure to which the 
Internet is perfectly suited. The Net offers a way for like-minded people located in 
different communities to interact easily, which is particularly important when 
operatives may be isolated and having to ‘lie low.’ Denied a physical place to meet 
and organize, many terrorist groups are alleged to have created virtual communities 
through chat rooms and Web sites in order to continue spreading their propaganda, 
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teaching, and training. Clearly, “information technology gives terrorist organizations 
global power and reach without necessarily compromising their invisibility.”30 It 
“puts distance between those planning the attack and their targets…[and] provides 
terrorists a place to plan without the risks normally associated with cell or satellite 
phones.”31  
  
Information Gathering 
This refers to the capacity of Internet users to access huge volumes of information, 
which was previously extremely difficult to retrieve as a result of its being stored in 
widely differing formats and locations. Today, there are literally hundreds of Internet 
tools that aid in information gathering; these include a range of search engines, 
millions of subject-specific email distribution lists, and an almost limitless selection 
of esoteric chat and discussion groups. One of the major uses of the Internet by 
terrorist organizations is thought to be information gathering. Unlike the other uses 
mentioned above terrorists’ information gathering activities rely not on the operation 
of their own Web sites, but on the information contributed by others to “the vast 
digital library” that is the Internet.32 There are two major issues to be addressed here. 
The first may be termed ‘data mining’ and refers to terrorists using the Internet to 
collect and assemble information about specific targeting opportunities. The second 
issue is ‘information sharing,’ which refers to more general online information 
collection by terrorists. 
 
Data Mining 
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In January 2003, US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld warned in a directive sent 
to military units that too much unclassified, but potentially harmful material was 
appearing on Department of Defence (DoD) Web sites. Rumsfeld reminded military 
personnel that an al-Qaeda training manual recovered in Afghanistan states: “Using 
public sources openly and without resorting to illegal means, it is possible to gather at 
least eighty percent of information about the enemy.” He went on to say, “at more 
than 700 gigabytes, the DoD Web-based data makes a vast, readily available source of 
information on DoD plans, programs and activities. One must conclude our enemies 
access DoD Web sites on a regular basis.”33  
In addition to information provided by and about the armed forces, the free 
availability of information on the Internet about the location and operation of nuclear 
reactors and related facilities was of particular concern to public officials post 9/11. 
Roy Zimmerman, director of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) Office of 
Nuclear Security and Incident Response, said the 9/11 attacks highlighted the need to 
safeguard sensitive information. In the days immediately after the attacks, the NRC 
took their Web site entirely off line. When it was restored weeks later, it had been 
purged of more than 1,000 sensitive documents. Initially, the agency decided to 
withhold documents if “the release would provide clear and significant benefit to a 
terrorist in planning an attack.” Later, the NRC tightened the restriction, opting to 
exclude information “that could be useful or could reasonably be useful to a terrorist.” 
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According to Zimmerman, “it is currently unlikely that the information on our Web 
site would provide significant advantage to assist a terrorist.”34  
 The measures taken by the NRC were not exceptional. According to a report 
produced by OMB Watch,35 since 9/11 thousands of documents and tremendous 
amounts of data have been removed from US government sites. The irony, however, 
is that much of the same information remains available on private sector Web sites.36  
Patrick Tibbetts points to the Animated Software Company's Web site which has off-
topic documents containing locations, status, security procedures and other technical 
information concerning dozens of U.S. nuclear reactors,37 while the Virtual Nuclear 
Tourist site contains similar information. The latter site is particularly detailed on 
specific security measures that may be implemented at various nuclear plants 
worldwide38 (Tibbetts 2002, 15). Many people view such information as a potential 
gold mine for terrorists. Their fears appear well founded given the capture of al-Qaeda 
computer expert Muhammad Naeem Noor Khan in Pakistan in July 2004, which 
yielded a computer filled with photographs and floor diagrams of buildings in the 
U.S. that terrorists may have been planning to attack.39  
  
Sharing Information 
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Policymakers, law enforcement agencies, and others are also concerned about the 
proliferation of ‘how to’ Web pages devoted to explaining, for example, the technical 
intricacies of making homemade bombs. Many such devices may be constructed using 
lethal combinations of otherwise innocuous materials; today, there are hundreds of 
freely available online manuals containing such information. As early as April 1997, 
the US Department of Justice had concluded that the availability of this information 
played a significant role in facilitating terrorist and other criminal acts.40 
As an example, Jessica Stern points to Bacteriological Warfare: A Major 
Threat to North America (1995), which is described on the Internet as a book for 
helping readers survive a biological weapons attack and is subtitled ‘What Your 
Family Can Do Before and After.’ However, it also describes the reproduction and 
growth of biological agents and includes a chapter entitled ‘Bacteria Likely To Be 
Used By the Terrorist.’ The text is available for download, in various edited and 
condensed formats, from a number of sites  while hard copies of the book are 
available for purchase over the Internet from major online booksellers for as little as 
$13 (Stern 1999, 51).  
 More recently, an Al Qaeda laptop found in Afghanistan had been used to visit 
the Web site of the French Anonymous Society (FAS) on several occasions. The FAS 
site publishes a two-volume Sabotage Handbook that contains sections on planning an 
assassination and anti-surveillance methods amongst others.41  A much larger manual, 
nicknamed The Encyclopedia of Jihad and prepared by al Qaeda, runs to thousands of 
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pages; distributed via the Web, it offers detailed instructions on how to establish an 
underground organization and execute terror attacks.42 
 This kind of information is sought out not just by sophisticated terrorist 
organizations but also by disaffected individuals prepared to use terrorist tactics to 
advance their idiosyncratic agendas. In 1999, for instance, right-wing extremist David 
Copeland planted nail bombs in three different areas of London: multiracial Brixton, 
the largely Bangladeshi community of Brick Lane, and the gay quarter in Soho. Over 
the course of three weeks, he killed three people and injured 139. At his trial, he 
revealed that he had learned his deadly techniques from the Internet by downloading 
copies of The Terrorist’s Handbook and How to Make Bombs: Book Two. Both titles 
are still easily accessible.43 
 
The Open Source Threat? 
The threat posed by the easy availability of bomb-making and other ‘dangerous 
information’ is a source of heated debate. Patrick Tibbetts warns against 
underestimating the feasibility of such threats. He points out that captured Al Qaeda 
materials include not only information compiled on ‘home-grown explosives,’ but 
also indicate that this group are actively pursuing data and technical expertise 
necessary to pursue CBRN weapons programs. According to Ken Katzman, a 
terrorism analyst for the Congressional Research Service, much of the material in 
these captured documents was probably downloaded from the Internet.44 As a result, 
many have called for laws restricting the publication of bomb-making instructions on 
the Internet. Others, however, have pointed out that this material is already easily 
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accessible in bookstores and libraries.45 In fact, much of this information has been 
available in print media since at least the late 1960s, with the publication of William 
Powell’s The Anarchist Cookbook and other, similar titles.  
  Jessica Stern has observed: “In 1982, the year of the first widely reported 
incident of tampering with pharmaceuticals, the Tylenol case, only a few 
poisoning manuals were available, and they were relatively hard to find.”46 This is 
doubtless true; they were hard to find, but they were available. As Stern herself 
concedes, currently how-to manuals on producing chemical and biological agents 
are not just available on the Internet, but are advertised in paramilitary journals 
sold in magazine shops all over the United States.47 According to a US 
government report, over fifty publications describing the fabrication of explosives 
and destructive devices are listed in the Library of Congress and are available to 
any member of the public, as well as being easily available commercially.48 
Despite assertions to the contrary,49 the infamous Anarchist Cookbook (1971) is 
not available online, although it is easily purchased from bookstores or online 
retailers. The anonymous authors of Web sites claiming to post the Cookbook and 
similar texts often include a disclaimer that the processes described should not be 
carried out. This is because many of the ‘recipes’ have a poor reputation for 
reliability and safety.   
 Perhaps the most likely ‘recipes’ to be of use to terrorists are those related to 
hacking tools and activities. Such information is also likely to be considerably more 
accurate than bomb making information, for example; this is because the Internet is 
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both the domain and tool of hackers. In testimony before the US House Armed 
Services Committee in 2003, Purdue University professor and information assurance 
expert, Eugene Spafford said bulletin boards and discussion lists teach hacking 
techniques to anyone: “We have perhaps a virtual worldwide training camp,” he 
testified.50 Terrorists have been known to exploit this resource. Imam Samudra’s 
instructions regarding the use of chat rooms favored by hackers to obtain information 
about ‘carding’ have already been mentioned. In 1998, Khalid Ibrahim, who identified 
himself as an Indian national, sought classified and unclassified US government 
software and information, as well as data from India's Bhabha Atomic Research 
Center, from hackers communicating via Internet Relay Chat (IRC). Using the online 
aliases RahulB and Rama3456, Ibrahim began frequenting online cracker hangouts in 
June 1998. In conversations taken from IRC logs, Ibrahim claimed to be a member of 
Harkat-ul-Ansar, a militant Kashmiri separatist group.51  
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that removal of technical information 
from public Web sites is no guarantee of safeguarding it. In essence, this effort is akin 
to ‘closing the barn door after the horse has bolted.’ Intelligence and technical data 
obtained by terrorist operatives prior to 9/11 can be archived, stored and distributed 
surreptitiously irrespective of government or private attempts to squelch its presence 
on the Internet in 2005. Indeed, these materials can be loaded onto offshore or other 
international Web servers that cannot be affected by US legislation, rendering any 
attempt to halt their spread outside the reach of American law enforcement.52 
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Fighting Back 
 
In his 1996 assessment of the Internet Charles Swett suggested that as more foreign 
officials, military officers, business people, and journalists got e-mail addresses, the 
Internet could be used as a medium for psychological operations campaigns. The 
Internet, he said, could rapidly convey the official government perspective on a host 
of important issues to a wide and influential audience.53 To date, however, most 
official government Web sites are limited to routine public affairs whereas it is 
commonplace on the Web to see public diplomacy conducted on behalf of a host of 
political dissenters, including terrorists.  Use of the Internet is a double-edged sword 
for terrorists, however. They are not the only groups ‘operating’ the Net, which can 
act as a valuable tool for anti-terrorist forces also. The more terrorist groups use the 
Internet to move information, money, and recruits around the globe, the more data 
that is available with which to trail them. Since 9/11 a number of groups have 
undertaken initiatives to disrupt terrorist use of the Internet, although a small number 
of such efforts were also undertaken previous to the attacks. Law enforcement 
agencies have been the chief instigators of such initiatives, but they have been joined 
in their endeavors by other government agencies as well as concerned individuals and 
various groups of hacktivists. 
 
The Role of Law Enforcement and Intelligence Agencies 
 
Intelligence Gathering 
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The bulk of this chapter has been concerned with showing how the Internet can act as 
a significant source of instrumental power for terrorist groups. Use of the Internet can 
nonetheless also result in significant undesirable effects for the same groups. First, 
unless terrorists are extremely careful in their use of the Internet for e-mail 
communication, general information provision, and other activities, they may 
unwittingly supply law enforcement agencies with a path direct to their door. Second, 
by putting their positions and ideological beliefs in the public domain, terrorist groups 
invite opposing sides to respond to these. The ensuing war of words may rebound on 
the terrorists as adherents and potential recruits are drawn away.54 Perhaps most 
importantly, however, the Internet and terrorist Web sites can serve as a provider of 
open source intelligence for states’ intelligence agencies. Although spy agencies are 
loathe to publicly admit it, it is generally agreed that the Web is playing an ever-
growing role in the spy business.  
 According to the 9/11 Commission’s Staff Statement No. 11, “open sources--
the systematic collection of foreign media--has always been a bedrock source of 
information for intelligence. Open source remains important, including among 
terrorist groups that use the media and the Internet to communicate leadership 
guidance.”55 By the 1990s the US government’s Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service (FBIS) had built a significant translation effort as regards terrorism-related 
media. Thus many now believe that terrorists’ presence on the Internet actually works 
against them. “A lot of what we know about al-Qaida is gleaned from [their] 
websites,” according to Steven Aftergood, a scientist at the Federation of American 
Scientists in Washington, D.C., and director of the nonprofit organization's Project on 
                                                 
54
 Soo Hoo, Goodman & Greenberg , p.140. 
55
 Staff Statement No. 11, The Performance of the Intelligence Community (Washington DC: 9/11 
Commission, 2004), p.9. Full text available online at http://www.9-
11commission.gov/staff_statements/staff_statement_11.pdf. 
 22 
Government Secrecy.56 “They are a greater value as an intelligence source than if they 
were to disappear.”57 For example, Web sites and message boards have been known 
to function as a kind of early warning system. Two days before the 9/11 attacks, a 
message appeared on the popular Dubai-based Alsaha.com discussion forum 
proclaiming that “in the next two days,” “a big surprise” would come from the Saudi 
Arabian region of Asir. The remote province adjacent to Yemen was where most of 
the nineteen hijackers hailed from.58  
 Innovations such as the FBIS, while useful, do not tell the whole story, 
however. The problem begins with the sheer volume of information floating about in 
cyberspace. According to the 9/11 Commission’s Staff Statement No. 9, prior to 9/11 
the FBI did not have a sufficient number of translators proficient in Arabic and other 
relevant languages, which by early 2001 had resulted in a significant backlog of 
untranslated intelligence intercepts. In addition, prior to 9/11, the FBI’s investigative 
activities were governed by Attorney General Guidelines, first put in place in 1976 
and revised in 1995, to guard against the misuse of government power. The 
Guidelines limited the investigative methods and techniques available to FBI agents 
conducting preliminary investigations of potential terrorist activities. In particular, 
they prohibited the use of publicly available source information, such as that found on 
the Internet, unless specified criteria were present.59 These guidelines have since been 
modified and terrorist Web sites are thought to be under increased surveillance since 
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9/11, especially by Western intelligence agencies.60 This task remains gargantuan, 
however; information gleaned from the Net must be corroborated and verified before 
it can be added to the intelligence mix. This requires significant input of operatives 
and resources.  
 
Technological Fixes 
Given the above, it is unsurprising that many US officials and commentators are 
recommending that any additional funds that become available to the intelligence 
agencies be spent on human intelligence capabilities, rather than new technology. 
Others, however, are convinced that new technologies need to be developed and 
deployed in the fight against terrorism. They bemoan the fact that prior to 9/11, 
“Signals intelligence collection against terrorism, while significant, did not have 
sufficient funding within the NSA. The NSA’s slow transformation meant it could not 
keep pace with advances in telecommunications.”61 Although DCS-1000--more 
commonly known as Carnivore--the FBI’s e-mail packet-sniffer system has not been 
employed since 2002, Bureau officials have instead employed commercially available 
monitoring applications to aid in their investigations. Intelligence agencies are also 
said to be deploying the classic spy tactic of establishing so-called ‘honey pots’ with a 
high-tech twist: in this case, setting up bogus Web sites to attract those people they 
are seeking to monitor.62 Numerous other technological fixes are also in the works.  
 
Other Innovations 
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It should be clear at this stage that the events of 9/11 impacted intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies not just in the United States, but around the world.  For 
example, in the UK MI5 took the unprecedented step of posting an appeal for 
information about potential terrorists on dissident Arab websites. The message, in 
Arabic, was placed on sites that the authorities knew were accessed by extremists, 
including ‘Islah.org,’ a Saudi Arabian opposition site, and ‘Qoqaz.com,’ a Chechen 
site which advocated jihad. The message read: 
 
The atrocities that took place in the USA on 11 September led to the deaths of 
about five thousand people, including a large number of Muslims and people 
of other faiths. MI5 (the British Security Service) is responsible for countering 
terrorism to protect all UK citizens of whatever faith or ethnic group. If you 
think you can help us to prevent future outrages call us in confidence on 020-
7930 9000. 
 
MI5 were hopeful of eliciting information from persons on the margins of extremist 
groups or communities who were sufficiently shocked by the events of 9/11 to want to 
contact the agency. The agency had intended to post the message on a further fifteen 
sites known to be accessed by radicals, but many of these were shut down by the FBI 
in the aftermath of the attacks.63 The events of 9/11 prompted numerous states’ 
intelligence agencies to reappraise their online presence. Since 2001, MI5 has 
substantially enhanced its Web site while in 2004, Israel’s Mossad spy agency 
launched a Web site aimed at recruiting staff.  
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Other Agencies: Sanitising Government Sites 
US government Web sites were vital repositories of information for Internet users in 
the days and weeks following the 9/11 attacks. The sites became important venues for 
those both directly and indirectly affected by the events of 9/11, members of the 
public wishing to donate to the relief efforts, and the various agencies’ own 
employees, some of whom were victims of the attacks (or later of the anthrax 
scares).64  
 While some agencies were uploading information onto the Net, however, 
others were busy erasing information from their sites. To avoid providing information 
that might be useful to terrorists planning further attacks, federal agencies, as well as 
some state and private Web page operators, took large amounts of material off the 
Internet in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Some of the erasures were voluntary; others 
were carried out following requests from US government departments. As mentioned 
earlier the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which regulates American nuclear power 
plants, closed its Web site down for a period following a request from the Department 
of Defence that it do so. Although no other agency removed its entire site, pages were 
erased from the Web sites of the Department of Energy, the Interior Department’s 
Geological Survey, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Environmental 
Protection Agency, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Department of 
Transportation’s Office of Pipeline Safety, the National Archives and Records 
Administration, the NASA Glenn Research Centre, the International Nuclear Safety 
Centre, the Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Bureau of Transportation Statistics’ 
Geographic Information Service, and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency.65  
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 What sorts of information was removed from the sites? The Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) removed thousands of chemical industry risk management 
plans dealing with hazardous chemical plants from its site. Department of 
Transportation officials removed pipeline mapping information as well as a study 
describing risk profiles of various chemicals, while the Bureau of Transportation 
Statistics removed the National Transportation Atlas Databases and the North 
American Transportation Atlas, which environmentalists had used to assess the 
impact of transportation proposals. The Center for Disease Control and Prevention 
removed a Report on Chemical Terrorism that described industry’s shortcomings in 
preparing for a possible terrorist attack.66 Many of the agencies posted notices that the 
information had been removed because of its possible usefulness to terrorists. 
 
Hackers and Hacktivists 
Hackers also took to the Net in the aftermath of the terror attacks, some to voice their 
rage, others to applaud the attackers. A group calling themselves the Dispatchers 
proclaimed that they would destroy Web servers and Internet access in Afghanistan 
and also target nations that support terrorism. The group proceeded to deface 
hundreds of Web sites and launch Distributed Denial of Service (DoS) attacks against 
targets ranging from the Iranian Ministry of the Interior to the Presidential Palace of 
Afghanistan. Another group, known as Young Intelligent Hackers Against Terror 
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(YIHAT) claimed, in mid-October 2001, to be negotiating with one European and one 
Asian government to ‘legalize’ the groups hacking activities in those states. The 
group’s founder, Kim Schmitz, claimed the group breached the systems of two Arabic 
banks with ties to Osama Bin Laden, although a spokesperson for the bank denied any 
penetration had occurred. The group, whose stated mission is to impede the flow of 
money to terrorists, issued a statement on their Web site requesting that corporations 
make their networks available to group members for the purpose of providing the 
“electronic equivalent to terrorist training camps.”  Later, their public Web site was 
taken offline, apparently in response to attacks from other hackers.67  
Not all hacking groups were supportive of the so-called ‘hacking war.’ On 14 
September 2001, the Chaos Computer Club, an organization of German hackers, 
called for an end to the protests and for all hackers to cease vigilante actions. They 
called instead for global communication to resolve the conflict: “we believe in the 
power of communication, a power that has always prevailed in the end and is a more 
positive force than hatred.”68  A well-known group of computer enthusiasts, known as 
Cyber Angels, who promote responsible behaviour, also spoke out against the hacking 
war. They sponsored television advertisements in the US urging hackers to help 
gather information and intelligence on those who were participating in this 
hacktivism.69 In any event, the predicted escalation in hack attacks70 did not 
materialize. In the weeks following the attacks, Web page defacements were well 
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publicized, but the overall number and sophistication of these remained rather low. 
One possible reason for the non-escalation of attacks could be that many hackers--
particularly those located in the US--were wary of being negatively associated with 
the events of 9/11 and curbed their activities as a result.  
 Since 9/11 a number of Web-based organisations have been established to 
monitor terrorist Web sites. One of the most well-known of such sites is Internet 
Haganah,71 self-described as “an internet counterinsurgency.” Also prominent is the 
Washington DC-based Search for International Terrorist Entities (SITE) Institute72 
that, like Internet Haganah, focuses on Islamic terror groups. Clients of SITE’s fee-
based intelligence service are said to include the FBI, Office of Homeland Security, 
and various media organizations. SITE's co-founder and director, Rita Katz, has 
commented: “It is actually to our benefit to have some of these terror sites up and 
running by American companies. If the servers are in the US, this is to our advantage 
when it comes to monitoring activities.”73 Aaron Weisburd, who runs Internet 
Haganah out of his home in Southern Illinois, says his goal is to keep the extremists 
moving from address to address: “The object isn't to silence them--the object is to 
keep them moving, keep them talking, force them to make mistakes, so we can gather 
as much information about them as we can, each step of the way.”74  
 
Conclusion 
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Terrorism is generally conceived as physical acts of violence intended to produce 
fear, and conjures up images of exploding bombs and mutilated bodies. The 
cyberterrorist threat as portrayed in the mass-media builds upon this aspect of 
terrorism by seeking to convince the public that cyberterrorism will ultimately result 
in mass casualties. There is another dimension to terrorism, however: the information 
dimension. And terrorists exploit it every bit as much as the physical.  Death and 
destruction is not terrorists’ ultimate goal; it is power and influence.  Terrorists seek 
political and social change, and their objective is to influence populations in ways that 
support that change.  To accomplish this, they engage not just in physical, but also 
information operations, and the integration of these. 
  Up until very recently, cyberterrorism was presented as the sole 
intersection of terrorism and the Internet, even in the face of contrary evidence. The 
one-sided nature of the analysis only became apparent to many when, in a little over 
four weeks in April and May 2004, one Abu Musab-al Zarqawi “rocketed to 
worldwide fame, or infamy, by a deliberate combination of extreme violence and 
Internet publicity.” In early April 2004, Zarqawi posted online a thirty minute audio 
recording which explained who he was, why he was fighting, and details of the 
attacks for which he and his group were responsible. Paul Eedle has described the 
latter as “a comprehensive branding statement”: 
 
The Internet gave Zarqawi the means to build a brand very quickly. Suddenly 
the mystery man had a voice, if not a face, and a clear ideology which 
explained his violence… But what is the point of an insurgent group building 
a brand, establishing a public profile in this way? The answer is to magnify 
the impact of its violence.  
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Prior to the instigation of his Internet-based PR campaign, each of Zarqawi’s attacks 
had to kill large numbers of people in order to get noticed in the chaos and mounting 
daily death toll in Iraq. By going online, however, Zarqawi was able to both control 
the interpretation of his violent message and achieve greater impact with smaller 
operations. By the end of April 2004, his group were regularly issuing communiqués 
via the Net. The first claimed responsibility for a suicide speedboat attack on Iraq’s 
offshore oil export terminal in the Gulf which, although the operation failed, still 
shook oil markets because of Zarqawi’s efforts at publicising the attack through the 
Internet.  
In May 2004 Zarqawi took things a step further when he used the Internet’s 
force multiplying effect to the maximum effect for the first time when 
 
…he personally cut off the head of an American hostage live on video, and 
had the footage posted on the Internet….The entire purpose of the beheading 
was to video it, to create images that would grip the imaginations of friends 
and enemies alike. It worked. Zarqawi risked almost nothing in this operation; 
but he started a withdrawal of foreign contractors which has paralysed 
reconstruction in Iraq and done as much if not more to undermine US plans as 
a bomb that killed 100 people in Najaf. And he made himself a hero to jihadis 
across the world.75 
 
The free availability of this and other grisly ‘snuff movies’ on the Internet led to a 
realisation that the most important aspect of the terrorism-Internet relationship was 
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not the much vaunted ‘cyberterrorism,’ but those more mundane and everyday 
terrorist uses of the Net, from information provision to recruitment, which have a 
pedigree stretching back for many years before Zarqawi’s appearance on the online 
scene.  
The most popular contemporary terrorist sites draw tens of thousands of 
visitors each month. Obviously, the Internet is not the only tool that a terrorist group 
needs to ‘succeed.’ However, the Net can add new dimensions to existing assets that 
groups can utilize to achieve their goals as well as providing new and innovative 
avenues for expression, fundraising, recruitment, etc. At the same time, there are also 
tradeoffs to be made. High levels of visibility increase levels of vulnerability, both to 
scrutiny and security breaches. Nonetheless, the proliferation of official terrorist sites 
appears to indicate that the payoffs, in terms of publicity and propaganda value, are 
understood by many groups to be worth the risks and Zarqawi’s exit from the 
terrorism scene emphatically does not mark the end of the evolution of the terrorism-
Internet relationship.  
 
FURTHER READING 
Gabriel Weimann’s Terror and the Internet: The New Arena, The New Challenges 
(Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006) is the major scholarly 
text dealing with the issues discussed here. For a list of useful newspaper and 
magazine reports and a smattering of scholarly articles--all of which are freely 
accessible online--see the bibliography entitled “Terror Online: Developments in the 
Use of New Media Technologies by Terrorist Organizations,” produced by the USC 
Center on Public Diplomacy in 2006 and available online at 
http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/pdfs/Terror_online.pdf. In terms of other useful online 
resources, Bob Cromwell’s list of Separatist, Para-military, Military, Intelligence, 
and Political Organizations, at http://www.cromwell-intl.com/security/netusers.html, 
is unfortunately very outdated at this stage, but updated links to the sites of many 
radical Islamic groups are accessible via Weisburd’s Internet Haganah site at 
http://haganah.org.il/haganah/index.html, while the Jamestown Foundation’s 
Terrorism Focus bulletins regularly contain analysis of the exchanges taking place on 
jihadi Internet forums and provide links to same. The latter may be accessed at 
http://www.jamestown.org. 
